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1 Introduction
The educational performance of immigrant youth has come to the attention of scholars and policy
makers. Recent studies from several European host countries show that school dropout rates are
higher and educational attainment is lower among children of non-Western immigrants than their
native peers; see Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Riphahn (2003; 2005) for evidence from
Germany, van Ours and Veenman (2003) for the Netherlands, Nielsen et al (2003) and Colding
(2006) for Denmark, Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) for Sweden, and Bauer and Riphahn
(2007) for Switzerland.1 A key policy concern is that such disparities in educational outcomes
will contribute to the formation of economically disadvantaged ethnic minorities and slow down
the long-term integration of non-Western immigrants in Europe.2
An important question is whether educational policy can alleviate ethnic disparities in at-
tainment. For example, it is commonly held that educational systems with early school tracking
reproduce educational inequalities across generations (Lauer, 2003; Bauer and Riphahn, 2006).
The question we pose in this paper is whether school capacity constraints also contribute to lower
attainment among ethnic minority youth. To study this question, we examine the outcome of a
major reform of Norwegian secondary education that was implemented in 1994. An important
component of this reform was that every graduate from compulsory schooling became entitled to
enrollment in public upper secondary education. In the pre-reform years there were significant
capacity constraints in secondary schools, both with respect to admission and to progression
through the upper level. While it is important to stress that the 1994 reform was non-targeted,
it may well be the case that immigrant youth were more affected by the capacity constraints of
the pre-reform system than native youth. The main aim here is to investigate this issue.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the progress through upper secondary educa-
tion of immigrant and native Norwegian youth for the cohorts that graduated from compul-
sory schooling between 1992 and 1995; that is, we examine the attainments of two pre-reform
and two post-reform cohorts. The progress through upper secondary education is studied as
annual transitions between grade levels, for four years after compulsory schooling. The empiri-
1An exception among European countries appears to be the United Kingdom; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos
(2006) document that the educational attainment of children of ethnic minority immigrants compares favorably
both to their own parents and their white British-born peers.
2Evidence from the United States shows that the intergenerational linkage in education is a key determinant of
the generational assimilation process of immigrant groups; see Borjas (1995; 2006), Trejo (1997), Card et al (2000).
Cameron and Heckman (2001) examine racial and ethnic differences in college attendance. See also the reviews
of the literatures on determinants of educational attainment in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and intergenerational
economic mobility in Solon (1999).
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cal methodology pays particular attention to the vitally important transition from compulsory
schooling to upper secondary education. Prior studies of immigrant-native differences in educa-
tional transitions in Norway are typically restricted to upper secondary students, an approach
that overlooks the vitally important transition from compulsory schooling.3
There are large differences in educational attainment between immigrant groups by country
of origin and the composition of the immigrant youth population changes from year to year.
Aggregation over immigrant groups can therefore be misleading when studying changes over
time (i.e., cohort differentials) in educational attainment. The approach chosen here is to study
the two largest long-term immigrant groups, Pakistanis and Vietnamese, and compare these
with ethnic Norwegian youth.
In the next two sections we provide further background on the reform as well as non-Western
immigration to Norway, while data are presented in section 4. The identification strategy is
discussed in section 5, followed by empirical results on the transition from compulsory schooling
to the first year of the upper secondary school. Section 7 describes the sequential binomial logit
framework along the lines of Cameron and Heckman (1998; 2001) for the sequence of transitions
throughout the three levels of the upper secondary school, before presenting the estimation
results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Norwegian upper secondary education and the 1994 reform
During the years of this study Norwegian youth typically finished compulsory schooling after
ninth grade in the summer of the year they turned 16. The majority went directly on to upper
secondary education in the autumn. The Norwegian upper secondary school system encom-
passes both theoretical education to prepare for tertiary education and vocational education
and training (apprenticeships). Upper secondary schools were predominantly (about 95 per-
cent) public and administered locally by the nineteen counties. Prior to the reform in 1994,
there were substantial capacity constraints in some counties (NOU, 1991; Briseid, 1995).4
Capacity limits on admission varied across counties and slots were typically allocated ac-
cording to performance (marks) in ninth grade, see NOU (1991) p. 35. To some extent, the
3Lødding (1999) and Opheim and Støren (2001) study differences between immigrant and majority youth en-
rolled in upper secondary education. Helland and Støren (2006) examine apprenticeships among ethnic Norwegian
and minority youth enrolled in vocational programs.
4Data on demand for upper secondary education (number of applicants by county and track) are generally
not available, implying that capacity constraints, or rationing for the first year, cannot be measured directly.
Application data from 1988, presented in NOU (1991) p.28, show that 95 percent of the pupils who left compulsory
schooling applied for admission to upper secondary schools, but only 84 percent was admitted.
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primary group of applicants who just finished compulsory schooling, was crowded out by older
applicants. In some of the larger cities, local pupils residing within the schools catchment area
were given priority. In addition, the vocational track had a structure that made it difficult to
proceed from the first year to further vocational schooling or apprenticeships. Such progression
depended on first-year performance, the supply of apprenticeships, and the ability of the pupils
in question to compete for these apprenticeships.
The major reform of secondary education, fully implemented by the autumn of 1994, changed
the system in a number of ways. Primarily, every adolescent born in 1978 or later were entitled
to start a three to four year upper secondary track upon completing compulsory schooling. To
meet this, every county had to come up with an offer of a complete secondary education for all
ninth graders in the spring of 1994 (as well as other youth under 20 who had dropped out of
school earlier). As part of the reform, the design of the vocational track changed into a system
of two years in school and two years of practice (apprenticeship). Due to excess demand for
apprenticeships a substantial proportion of the weaker students spent all four years in school.
The reform also increased the capacity and availability of slots in vocational track, in order to
reduce bottlenecks in the transition from the first year (10th grade) with a joint curriculum to
the second/third year with a craft-specific curriculum.
Although the reform was implemented relatively quickly, several counties expanded capacity
in 1993 in order to accommodate the right to a full secondary education for everyone as of the
autumn of 1994. The 1977 birth cohort was also smaller than the preceding cohorts, which
contributed to reduced excess demand the year before the implementation of the reform. Still,
the reform has some qualities of a natural experiment, as there was hardly any change in the
distribution of background characteristics across the four cohorts of this study. The reform was
implemented for the 10th grade in 1994, for the 11th grade in 1995, and for 12th grade in 1996.
Thus, a comparison of, e.g., the transitions from lower secondary into the first year of upper
secondary education for the pre-reform and the post-reform cohorts gives a good idea of the
effects of the reform on this transition.
3 Ethnic Minority Youth in Norway
Large scale immigration of non-Western origin from outside Europe is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon in Norway, roughly starting out with male labour migrants from Pakistan, Turkey,
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Morocco and India in the early 1970s. By far the largest group of labour migrants came from
Pakistan; see Bratsberg et al (2006) for a study of immigrant flows to Norway. After the mid
1970s, immigration from outside the Nordic countries was in principle restricted to specialists,
refugees, and political asylees as well as family reunifications. During the late 1970s and in the
early 1980s, Norway accepted a large number of “boat refugees” from Vietnam. In spite of the
restrictions, immigration accelerated, but the immigrant population in Norway remained fairly
small. The population share of immigrants increased from 4.3 percent to 5.9 percent during our
data the period (1992-1999), gradually approaching 8.3 percent by 2006. To reduce problems of
unobserved heterogeneity across cohorts, we limit our analyses to immigrant youth originating
from Pakistan and Vietnam. These two groups constitute about half of the immigrant youth
with a non-Western, non-European origin and about 1 percent of the compulsory schooling
graduate cohorts of 1992-95.
4 Data
The data are extracted from official Norwegian registers, and include the full populations. The
populations studied are the four graduating cohorts from compulsory schooling in the years
1992-95, as identified by the education register. We restrict the analyses to those who graduated
during the calendar year they turned 15, 16, or 17. This includes the vast majority of pupils,
between 98 and 99 percent of the relevant age cohorts. The data are based on matched registers,
using personal identification numbers. In addition to the educational information, a range of
demographic and economic data are available, such as immigrant status, country of origin and
the date of first arrival in Norway. Intergenerational links enables us to include detailed parental
background information.
The groups are defined on the basis of immigrant status, country of origin and date of first
arrival in Norway. The immigrant groups consist of individuals with two parents born in either
Pakistan or Vietnam. The youth samples include both those born in Norway and those born
abroad provided they arrived in Norway before their 13th birthday. The native comparison
group consists of individuals born in Norway by two Norwegian-born parents.
Data on participation in education and the highest completed grade level by October 1st
every year between 1993 and 1999 are used in this study. Most secondary education tracks had
readily defined grade levels 10-12 both before and after the school reform. For educational tracks
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without a formal completion at grades 10 or 11, a grade level is considered completed if the pupil
participates in a course at the next level. Thus, the data are not suitable for decomposition of
transition rates into participation and completion conditional on participation.
Table 1 presents highest completed educational attainment four years after completion of
compulsory schooling, by cohort and group. In general, the Pakistani youth have less favorable
attainment than the Vietnamese and native youth groups. Attainment of the Vietnamese group
is almost at the same level as for natives. In fact, while not tabulated, Vietnamese immigrants
who arrived in Norway before first grade had educational attainments at the same level as
natives.
Table 1 also reveals that educational attainment generally improved over the sample period,
and particularly so for the Pakistani group. The proportion of the youth at age 20 with little or
no educational qualifications beyond compulsory schooling decreased substantially for all three
groups. The fraction of natives with compulsory schooling only decreased from 3.6 percent
of the 1993 cohort to 2.6 percent of the 1995 cohort. The same proportion decreased from
18.8 to 8.6 percent for the Pakistani group, and from 5.0 to 4.3 percent for the Vietnamese
group. Similarly, the proportion of natives with at most one year of completed upper secondary
education decreased from 14.1 to 9.7 percent across the four cohorts; for Pakistanis, from 37.4
to 21.9 percent; and from 20.8 to 12.0 percent for the Vietnamese group.
The large differences in educational attainment of Pakistani and Vietnamese pupils are in-
teresting, particularly as the Pakistani group on average has stayed in Norway for a much longer
period. Cultural background may explain part of the difference, as empirical studies consistently
have found higher educational success among immigrants originating in countries with a domi-
nant Confucian tradition, e.g., Portes and MacLoed (1996). In Norway, studies have found that
Vietnamese pupils spend distinctly more time on homework, Lauglo (1999), and that they out-
perform Pakistanis in the final year of compulsory schooling, Bakken (2003), as well as in upper
secondary school, Støren (2006). It should be noted that, in our data, the Vietnamese youth
are distinctly different from most other non-Western immigrant groups in terms of educational
attainment.
As covariates in the analyses, we use parental educational background, age and income. The
income measure is drawn from the pension register. This facilitates using an average over several
years, thereby reducing measurement-error bias due to transitory changes in income. For this
purpose, we use a period of 6 years, starting 2 years before and ending 3 years after graduation
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from compulsory schooling. The drawback of these data is that annual incomes below 1 unit
of the Norwegian pension system (approximately 4000 Euros in 2003) are not observed and
treated as zero, and that incomes above 12 units (47,500 Euros) are top coded. Incomes are
measured in NOK 10,000 from 1997. Adjustments for changes in the price level are implicit in
the pension register data. In addition to the parental background information, gender, whether
born in Norway or abroad, and the age at immigration are included as covariates. The mean
and standard deviation of the covariates are given in Table 2. Missing values are typically set
to zero, though dummies signifying missing variables are included as covariates in the analyses.
Note from Table 2 that a much larger fraction of the Pakistani than the Vietnamese sample was
born in Norway and that the parents of the immigrant samples have distinctly lower incomes
and educational attainment than the parents of native youth.
5 Identifying the reform effect for minority youth
The data facilitate the study of annual transitions into and throughout upper secondary school-
ing, but in order to make the identification strategy transparent, we first focus on continuation
after the end of compulsory schooling. Table 3 displays this transition (i.e., from 9th to 10th
grade) as well as the population at risk in each cohort. As we show below, there were only mi-
nor changes in the background characteristics that influence educational attainment during this
period, so a comparison of pre-reform and post-reform transition rates gives a good indication of
the reform effects. However, a simple pre-post comparison will of course capture the impact of
all other contextual factors that changed over the sample period (to be discussed more below).
The proportion of natives who completed the first year of upper secondary within one year
of compulsory school was 0.88 in the pre-reform years and 0.92 in the post-reform years. For
Pakistani pupils, the transition rate changed tremendously during the short period from 1992
to 1995, with an increase from 0.56 for the 1992 cohort to 0.83 for the 1995 cohort. However,
the largest fall in the dropout rate did not exactly coincide with the reform year, but came
instead the year prior to the reform. For the Vietnamese cohorts, the transition rate improved
as well, and again the improvement was largest between the 1992 and 1993 cohorts. For the
Vietnamese group, the first year transition rates were about the same as for the native control
group for the last three cohorts. The improved immigrant transition rate between 1992 and
1993 indicates that the counties started to increase their capacity in anticipation of the reform,
8
even before the reform was fully implemented. With a few exceptions, the school reform seems
to have affected the immigrant groups in about the same way as natives, but the increase in
the transition rate to 10th grade was much stronger for the Pakistani group than for the other
groups. The main question is whether the improvement in the transition to 10th grade for
Pakistani students, and partly the Vietnamese, can be attributed to the reform. An obvious
alternative explanation is pupil heterogeneity across cohorts, even within groups with the same
country of origin. Note that sample sizes for immigrants are relatively small, so the stability of
family background characteristics like for natives, is far from apparent. However, controlling for
differences in pupil and family characteristics does not affect the cohort differentials, see below.
A direct test would be to estimate the effect of capacity constraints on individual transitions,
but, unfortunately, information on the degree of rationing for compulsory school graduates
of ethnic minority background who seek to enter upper secondary schooling is not available.
However, the proportion of native Norwegian pupils in each county who completed the first
year of upper secondary school within a year of leaving compulsory schooling is a natural proxy
for the county- and time specific capacity constraint. Following this idea, we model Pakistani
and Vietnamese transition probabilities as functions of the transition probabilities for natives
in the same cohort-by-county cell. A crude analysis would be to regress the 76 (i.e., 19x4)
county-by-cohort specific transition rates for each immigrant group on the corresponding rate
for natives. Such a data set is essentially a panel data set, and the amount of information from
introducing county differences is expanded from 4 data points (each cohort) to 76 data points,
giving us the opportunity to investigate the strength of the relationship even in the presence
of large unexplained variation in the response variable. In addition, it is possible to test the
implicit assumption that the effect of differences in native transition rates across counties is the
same as the effect of differences across cohorts. The method used here is a refinement of such
an empirical strategy.
First, the model is specified in terms of transition probabilities rather than transition rates.
Transition rates are only estimates of such probabilities, with measurement errors that are
decreasing in the number of observations in each cell. With the model specified in terms of
probabilities such measurement errors are explicitly taken into account. Second, the functional
relationship between the transition probabilities for native and immigrant youth are specified
as being linear in the log odds of the probabilities. One implication of this specification is
that probability differences of the same absolute magnitude will be considered larger the further
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away they are from 0.5 (e.g., a change from, say, 0.98 to 0.99 is larger than a change from
0.56 to 0.57). The third refinement is that individual explanatory variables are taken into
account, separately for each of the native and two immigrant groups. Thus, the measure of
“capacity constraints” can be interpreted as how difficult it was for a native pupil with average
background characteristics to make the particular transition. Finally, the modeling explicitly
takes into account differences in composition (such as the proportion born in Norway) across
the minority county-cohort groups.
This identification strategy relies on the assumption that county-cohort specific effects, aris-
ing from other factors than the reform, are uncorrelated for natives and the ethnic minority
groups. Otherwise, the county-cohort specific transition rates would simply pick up other fac-
tors, wrongly attributed to the reform. To check for the presence of time-variant county factors
common to both immigrants and natives, local unemployment rates were included as covariates.
The effects were found to be small and statistically insignificant. The absence of an influence of
local labor market conditions on the school continuation probability at age 16 is also documented
elsewhere, see Raaum and Røed (2006), p. 204.
The model is specified as follows. The log odds of the probability pN that a native pupil in
county r from cohort c with individual covariate vector xN will complete 10th grade in the first
year after compulsory schooling is given by
log
pN
1− pN = γc,r + xNβN , (1)
and the log odds of the corresponding probability pP for a Pakistani pupil with individual
covariate vector xP is given by
log
pP
1− pP = θ1 + θ2γc,r + xPβP , (2)
where γc,r, βN , βP , θ1 and θ2 are unknown parameters and parameter vectors to be estimated.
A similar equation is estimated for the Vietnamese group.
The model is estimated in two steps, by first estimating equation (1) by maximum likelihood,
and then using the parameter estimates of γc,r as regressors in maximum likelihood estimation
of equation (2). Little efficiency is lost by this procedure compared to simultaneous maximum
likelihood, as there are far more natives than Pakistanis and Vietnamese in our populations.
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6 Empirical results on school dropouts
Our first results focus on the transition between lower and upper secondary education, i.e.,
from 9th to 10th grade. The γc,r-parameters are interpreted as capacity constraints, reflecting
variation in (inverse) dropout rates among majority youth across counties and time. The cohort-
specific weighted means for each group (weighted by the proportion of the group in each cohort
living in that county) are shown in Table 3. For the native sample, the mean increased from
the pre- to the post-reform period, a reflection of the improvement in transition rates in Table
2. For the Pakistani group, the change in the capacity-constraint measure was slightly larger,
simply due to the residential concentration in the capital area where transition rates increased
substantially for natives. The Vietnamese were more widely spread across the country, and the
weighted γc,r-parameters are similar to those of the majority group. When the γc,r-parameters
are translated into transition probabilities, the dispersion across counties is also substantially
reduced from the pre- to the post-reform period.
Table 5, column 1, reports the estimated effects of gender and family background for na-
tives. The conventional pattern appears where girls drop out less frequently than boys and
educational success relates positively to parental education, earnings, and age. The model also
contains dummy variables for missing parents and missing educational information on parents.
In addition, the 76 γc,r -parameters summarized in Table 4 are not tabulated. The next columns
are based on the Pakistani sample, where columns 2 and 3 address the issue of cohort hetero-
geneity in terms of family background characteristics. As the coefficients of the cohort dummies
are basically the same across the two columns, it seems unlikely that the Pakistani pupils of
the post-reform cohort had individual characteristics that made them more likely to continue
education after completing compulsory schooling.
The measures of capacity constraints are included in the model reported in column 4, and
two important results appear. First, the point estimate of θ2 is 1.44. The interpretation is that a
change in the county-cohort specific capacity constraint yields a change in the log odds transition
probability of Pakistani youth that is almost 1.5 times that of natives. The finding is consistent
with a mechanism in which capacity constraints disproportionally impact weaker students in
ninth grade. As pointed out above, Pakistani students typically had less favorable performance
than the other two groups. Second, the coefficients of the cohort dummies are substantially
reduced when the capacity-constraint measures are included in the model. In particular, there
11
is no longer a significant difference between the pre- and post-reform cohorts. This pattern is
clearly shown in columns 5 and 6 where the cohort dummies are restricted to a simple pre-post
structure. The Pakistani post-reform cohorts significantly outperformed their older peers, but
this performance differential disappears when we account for differences in capacity constraints
facing pre- and post-reform cohorts.
In the model given by equation (2), it is implicitly assumed that the effect of differences in
γc,r is the same over counties and cohorts. For purposes of specification testing, we estimated
two generalizations of the model. Let γc,. denote the mean value of γc,r among Pakistanis from
cohort c. One generalization is given by substituting equation (3) for equation (2).
log
pP
1− pP = θ1 + θ2a(γc,r − γc,.) + θ2b(γc,.) + xPβP . (3)
In this specification, the parameter θ2a represents the effect of within-cohort differences in capac-
ity constraints across counties, while θ2b represents the effect of changes in (average) constraints
across cohorts. The restriction θ2a = θ2b leads to the simpler model. The estimation results
shown in the final column of Table 4 reveal remarkably similar estimates for θ2a and θ2b and the
restriction of the previous specifications can clearly not be rejected by a Wald test.
Table 6 shows analogous analyses for the Vietnamese sample. The smaller sample implies
that estimates are less precise, but the coefficient pattern is the same as for the Pakistani group:
Variation in family characteristics do not explain cohort differentials, the capacity-constraint
variable has a significant effect on the transition probability, and the cohort differentials drop con-
siderably when we account for changes in capacity constraints. Finally, the capacity-constraint
effect is almost the same, whether we estimate it within or between cohorts. It is also worth
noting that the point estimate of θ2 is lower than for the Pakistani group, consistent with the
hypothesis that the reform had a greater impact on groups with low school performance.
7 Continuation, selection, and reform effects
One of the prime concerns that motivated the reform was the incomplete transition from 10th
to 11th grade. Prior to the reform, there existed significant bottlenecks, particularly in the
vocational track (Støren et al, 1998). The pattern of Table 1 with a decreasing share of pupils
with only 10 years of education is consistent with the reform leading to a reduction in such
constraints.
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In a complete assessment of the effects of the upper secondary school reform, two more
issues must be addressed. First, the reform affected delayed pupils (dropouts) from the pre-
reform cohorts. Secondly, changes in the transition from one grade to the next (e.g., 9th to 10th
grade) may induce compositional changes in the population at risk for the following transition
(10th to 11th grade). In other words, differences in pre- and post-reform transition rates, and
thereby estimated cohort effects, are potentially contaminated by selection effects arising from
unobserved heterogeneity.
Tables 7 - 9 decompose the attainment statistics in Table 1 into annual transition rates, by
cohort and group, thus expanding Table 3 to all possible grade-year transitions in the data. In
the second year, the transition to 11th grade is possible for those who completed 10th grade,
while the transition to 10th grade is still possible for those who did not complete 10th grade the
previous year, and so on. Population sizes denote the individuals at risk for the transition, i.e.,
those who had completed the lower grade.
The reform affected all transitions for the 1994 and 1995 cohorts, as well as those from the
1993 cohort who were delayed at least one year and the 1992 cohort who were delayed at least
two years. Thus, when we extend the analysis beyond the first transition (to 10th grade), there
is no simple relationship between reform status and 9th grade graduation cohort. A comparison
of pre-reform and post-reform transition rates for natives provides a first indication of how the
reform changed transitions through upper secondary education. However, in the transitions in
the second year and onwards, the population that make up the risk set is selected.
Among those who did not complete 10th grade in the first year after compulsory school, the
proportion among natives who completed 10th grade in the next year (row 2) rose from 0.56
for the 1992 (pre-reform) cohort to 0.62 for the 1993 (here, post-reform) cohort. The second
year transition rate to 10th grade dropped again for the later cohorts, this may be because
the group was now smaller and thus likely to be less favorably selected. The transition rates
to 11th grade also showed an upturn from 0.78 for the 1992 (pre-reform) cohort to 0.86 for
the 1994 and 1995 (post-reform) cohorts. We interpret these changes as removal of capacity
constraints, particularly in the vocational courses. The transitions to 12th grade showed a
different development, with lower post-reform transition rates. For example, the rate dropped
from about 0.8 to 0.7 for those who had completed 11th grade two years after compulsory school.
This likely reflects a particular feature of the reform which implied that, within the vocational
track 24 months of actual schooling were required to complete the 12th grade (often referred to
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as the ”third” year). With this in mind, we will focus on transitions from 10th to 11th grade.
For the Pakistani group, the transition rates to 10th grade in the second year after compulsory
schooling showed a strong increase for the 1993 cohort (with the introduction of the reform)
compared to the 1992 cohort, and a subsequent decrease for delayed pupils. The introduction
of the reform can apparently also be seen in the transition rates to 11th grade, with a marked
increase between the 1993 and 1994 cohorts. However, unlike the transition rate to 10th grade,
the change in the transition to 11th grade is only at about the same level as for natives. For the
Vietnamese, the increase in the second-year transition rate to 11th grade was also strong, with
most of the increase taking place from the 1992 to the 1993 cohort.
7.1 Model specification
The model is specified in the spirit of Cameron and Heckman (1998; 2001). The transitions are
modeled as a sequence of binomial logit models. For each year following graduation from lower
secondary education, the response is whether or not the pupil increased the highest completed
educational level. Thus, pupils who start the next level, but fail to pass exams, do not make
the transition. The model specified here allows for 9 different transition types, corresponding
to the various combinations of grade level and years since ninth grade tabulated in Tables 7-9.
Selection effects reflect unobserved heterogeneity, modeled as a pupil specific, one-dimensional
random effect that affects all transition probabilities for the individual. A separate parameter
associated with the random effect is estimated for each type of transition.
The log odds of the probability pg,yn that a native from cohort c, living in county r, completes
grade level g, exactly y years after leaving compulsory school, conditional on having completed
grade level g − 1 but not grade level g a year before, is now given by
log(
pg,yN
1− pg,yN
) = γg,yc,r + xNβ
g,y
N + α
g,y
N v, (4)
where γg,yc,r , β
g,y
N , and α
g,y
N are parameters to be estimated for each of the 9 possible combinations
of g and y and for four different cohorts c and nineteen counties r, and v is an unknown,
individual-specific random variable, with independent standard normal distribution.
The log odds of the transition probability pg,yP for Pakistani pupils is specified as,
log(
pg,yP
1− pg,yP
) = θg,y1 + θ
g,y
2 γ
g,y
c,r + xPβ
g,y
P + α
g,y
P v (5)
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with an analogous specification for the Vietnamese group.
The model has one restriction across different grade-year combinations. It is required that
γg,y+1c,r = τ
g,y+1
1 + τ
g,y+1
2 γ
g,y
c+1,r, (6)
where τ g,y+11 and τ
g,y+1
2 are parameters to be estimated. (Identifiability requires the normaliza-
tions τ10,11 = τ
11,2
1 = τ
12,3
1 = 0 and τ
10,1
2 = τ
11,2
2 = τ
12,3
2 = 1.)
Like in our analysis of the transition from lower to upper secondary school, the parameters
γc,r are interpreted as proxies for capacity constraints (for that grade level in that county in that
year.) This measure affects everyone who is exposed to a transition to the same grade level in
the same year (i.e., whether the pupil is delayed or not). The model specification is symmetric
with respect to the different years of delay, groups and years.
Define the variables dg,y as equal to 2 if the pupil completed grade level g exactly y years
after completing lower secondary education. Let dg,y be equal to 1 if the pupil did not complete
grade level g exactly y years after completing lower secondary school, but had completed grade
level g−1 but not grade level g a year before. Finally, define dg,y as equal to zero if (i) this type
of transition is not modeled (e.g. d12,1 = 0 for everyone because no one was at risk for transition
to 12th grade the year after completing 9th grade), (ii) the pupil had already completed grade
level g by year y − 1, (iii) the pupil had not completed grade level g − 1 by year y − 1, or (iv)
the pupil’s educational attainments was not observed at this stage due to sample attrition.
Now, the likelihood of an educational career can be expressed as
L =
∞∫
−∞
12∏
g=10
4∏
y=1
(pg,yj (v))
1(dg,y=2)(1− pg,yj (v))1(dg,y=1)φ(v)dv. (7)
Thus, the likelihood of an educational career, conditional on the individual-specific random
effect and observed characteristics, is simply the product of the likelihoods associated with the
(usually) three or four transitions that this individual is exposed to.
The model is, for practical reasons, estimated sequentially, first by maximum likelihood for
natives, and then by maximum likelihood for the two immigrant groups, with estimates of γg,y
from the first stage added to the models for the Pakistani and Vietnamese groups. The integral
in the likelihood function is evaluated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 20 points.5
5For purposes of numerical stability, a weak penalty term involving the sum of squared α-parameters was
appended to the likelihood function.
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7.2 Unobserved heterogeneity and selection effects
While our model follows the approach of Cameron and Heckman (1998; 2001), it deviates with
respect to the handling of unobserved heterogeneity. The Cameron-Heckman approach assumes
that everyone (in a group) at risk for the same grade transition will follow the same equation
for the transition probability. (This is almost, but not strictly, an identifying assumption for
selection effects.) Thus, if students who are delayed in their educational career have lower
transition rates than others at risk for a certain transition, this is interpreted as a selection
effect and not a causal effect of delayed educational progress. We estimate separate parameters
for pupils with standard progression and those who are delayed, allowing for a causal impact of
delay on future transitions. Thus, our approach impose weaker assumptions when identifying
selection effects.
Arguably, the best strategy for identification of selection models is to use appropriate exclu-
sion restrictions, e.g. powerful time-varying covariates. The cross-cohort restrictions used here
operate as such and can be interpreted as unobserved time-varying covariates that are estimated
(as fixed effects). It is possible to find groups of students at risk for a certain transition with
different histories in terms of (earlier) transition probabilities, but who face similar capacity
constraints the current year, because the county-specific capacity constraints vary over time
(and type of transition). Different transition rates for groups with different histories but facing
the same current constraints indicate selection effects.
7.3 Empirical specification and results
The native control group model was specified with 11 covariates (gender, fathers income, age,
education, mothers income, age, education, dummies for missing parents, dummies for missing
educational information for parents) with free parameters for each type of transition. Inter-
cept terms and cohort dummies were included, when not linear dependent with the county-time
dummies. With 9 parameters for capturing selection effects, this gives a model with 474 pa-
rameters. (133 county-time dummies for transitions to grade level 10, 114 county-time dummies
for transitions to grade level 11, 95 county-time dummies for transitions to grade level 12, 99
parameters associated with covariates, 12 parameters for linear effects of county-time dummies,
12 cohort dummies, and 9 selection parameters). The models for Pakistanis and Vietnamese
were specified similarly, with the additional covariates capturing age at immigration and born
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in Norway.6
The aim of the estimation exercise is to decompose the cohort-year-grade differentials of
Tables 7-9 into causal reform effects and selection effects arising from compositional change (of
unobserved characteristics). While the empirical model accounts for all of the nine transitions,
the interpretational focus will be on the second year transition from 10th to 11th grade. The
estimated parameters, over 700 in number, are not easily interpretable (except for their signs).
The parameter estimates and their standard errors are therefore not reported, but are available
upon request.
Table 10 shows the parameters associated with the random effects for the three groups,
with Wald standard errors. While the exact values of the α-parameters are not pinpointed, the
models with selection effects clearly represent statistically significant improvements over models
without selection effects, with improvements in the log likelihood of respectively 37 and 15.5 for
the Pakistani and Vietnamese samples. (The latter, and weakest, result has a p-value of less
than 0.0003.) The model for natives indicates practically no selection effects on the basis of the
first year transition (i.e., due to selective 9th to 10th grade transitions), while there are stronger
selection effects from 11th grade to completion of 12th grade. For Pakistanis, the random-effects
estimates suggest significant selection effects for the standard progression transitions both from
9th to 10th, and from 10th to 11th grade. The precision of the estimates for the Vietnamese are
too imprecise to make firm conclusions.
The parameters in Table 10 are possible to interpret, in the sense that the model specified
by, e.g., equation (4) is equivalent to stating that the transition occurs if and only if y∗c,r > 0
with
y∗c,r = γ
g,y
c,r + xNβ
g,y
N + α
g,y
N v + g,y, (8)
where g,y are independent logistic variates. If we define νg,y = α
g,y
N v + g,y, it is possible to
compute the correlation between νg,y for different grade levels by the formula
corr(νg,y, νh,z) =
αg,yN α
h,z
N√
pi2/3 + (αg,yN )2
√
pi2/3 + (αh,zN )2
(9)
Capturing these correlations are the purpose of the α-parameters, and equation (9) shows the
6For some of the delayed transitions, sample sizes necessitated taking covariates out of the immigrant models,
as the covariates turned out to be perfect predictors of the transition. There were 139 parameters in the Pakistani
and 115 parameters in the Vietnamese model. The reduction in the number of covariates reflects that few students
were exposed to certain transitions, which indicates that the exact effects of the involved covariates were not likely
to be important for the overall results.
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structure imposed by the one-dimensional random effects on these correlations. The highest
(relevant) correlation between ν-parameters implied by Table 10 is about 0.5 associated with
the transition to 11th grade in the second year and the transition to 12th grade in the third year
following high school graduation for Norwegian natives.
We next turn to determinants of the transition from 10th to 11th grade during in the second
year after compulsory schooling. These analyses are similar to those in Section 6; results are
reported in Tables 11 and 12. The columns labeled ”Natives,” ”Pak. M1-M3,” and ”Vie. M1-
M3” report results from partial models of this transition, analogous to the first four columns of
Tables 5 and 6. The columns ”Pak. M4” and ”Vie. M4” list estimates from the large model
taking selection effects into account. For comparability the results are normalized.7
For Pakistanis, models M1-M3 in Table 11 show that substantial post-reform cohort effects
disappear when the capacity constraints are accounted for. This finding is robust to introducing
selection effects (column 5). Taken at face value, accounting for selection effects seems to increase
the reform effects somewhat, as the parameter estimates associated with capacity constraints
increase in value, while the cohort effects are not all that much affected.
For Vietnamese students, large post-reform cohort effects are only somewhat reduced by the
introduction of capacity constraints (see Table 12). In the model with selection effects (column
5), the point estimates indicate only a weak effect of the capacity constraints. However, the
uncertainty due to small sample size is substantial in these results.
To round off the analysis, we discuss conditional and unconditional transition rates from
10th to 11th grade based on the estimated model. The unconditional transition probabilities to
11th grade in the second year are computed by the formula
pu =
∞∫
−∞
P 11,2j (v)φ(v)dv, (10)
while conditional transition probabilities are computed by
pc =
∫∞
−∞ P
10,1
j (v)P
11,2
j (v)φ(v)dv∫∞
−∞ P
10,1
j (v)φ(v)dv
, (11)
7The normalization consists of multiplying parameters in M4 with the ratio (pi/
√
3) :
q
pi2/3 + (α11,2P )
2. The
scale of the θ-parameters are however also affected by the parameter α11,2N because this affects the scale of
γ11,2c,r and must be multiplied by the ratio
q
pi2/3 + (α11,2N )
2 :
q
pi2/3 + (α11,2P )
2. This normalization is only an
approximation, but would have been exact if  was normally distributed (with variance pi2/3) and not logistic.
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using Bayes’ rule.
The conditional transition probability corresponds to what we see in the data (if the model is
not misspecified). Conditional transition probabilities give the probability of transition weighted
by the probability of being at risk for the relevant transition. Unconditional transition proba-
bilities correspond to the transition rate in the hypothetical situation that the full population
had completed the previous level of schooling. Thus, the difference between the conditional
and unconditional rates measures the impact of selection (both from observed and unobserved
characteristics).
In Table 13 we list conditional and unconditional transition rates for the second year transi-
tion to 11th grade before and after the reform. Both the conditional and the unconditional rates
suggest substantial reform effects for all three groups, with increases in the transition rate in the
order of .06 to .09. For the native and Vietnamese groups, within-period point estimates yield
very similar conditional and unconditional transition probabilities, indicating little selection bias
in estimates. For the Pakistani group, the point estimates indicate a substantial difference in
the probabilities and larger selection effects. An important result is that the selection effect in
the Pakistani sample fell in the post-reform period.
We set out with the view that the simple transition rates in Tables 7-9 can be used to
assess the effects of the reform. Clearly, the assessment of reform effects will be confounded
if the role of selection was altered by the reform, as a result of changes in the composition of
the population at risk for a given transition. Because the difference between unconditional and
conditional transition probabilities reflects selection, an estimate of the selection bias in reform
effects will be given by the change in this difference from before to after the reform. In the
last column of Table 13, we list this difference-in-difference estimate along with its confidence
interval.8 As the table reveals, the difference-in-difference figures indicate no selection bias in
reform-effect estimates for the native and Vietnamese groups. For Pakistanis, the difference-in-
difference figure suggests that the change in the raw transition rate understates the effect of the
reform by two to three percentage points. Because the reform brought compositional change
in the population at risk, a change that in turn led to a reduction in selectivity, the effect of
the reform on the attainment of Pakistani students is actually higher than that implied by the
increase in the raw transition rate.
On the basis of the various results above, we therefore conclude that the reform effects on
8Confidence intervals for the immigrant groups are based on non-parametric bootstrapping. A similar confi-
dence interval for the native sample would be very small and extremely computationally intensive.
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the transition from the first to the second year of upper secondary education were at least of
the same magnitude for the immigrant groups as for natives. It is quite possible that the effects
of the reform were considerably stronger for Pakistani students than for natives, but that this
is masked by selection effects.
8 Conclusions
Educational performance of immigrant youth has fallen short of that among natives in Norway as
well as in other European countries. In Norway, the attainment of the two largest non-Western
groups who graduated from compulsory schooling in the period 1992-95, improved over time.
This paper addresses the impact of the upper secondary school reform implemented nationwide
in 1994, granting statutory right to at least three years of upper secondary education for those
who completed compulsory schooling. Specifically, we examine whether the improvement in
educational attainment among immigrant youth from the pre- to the post-reform years can be
attributed to the reform. We find no indication that compositional change in observed family
background, selection effects related to unobserved heterogeneity, or labor market conditions
can explain the change in immigrant attainment across graduation cohorts.
The reform effects are identified via the grade-county-cohort specific transitions rates for
native Norwegian students. These proxies of capacity constraints were both reduced and leveled
out across the country by the reform, and they affected the immigrant transitions significantly
and explained the major part of differences in transition rates between the pre- and the post-
reform cohorts. Our interpretation is buttressed by the fact that the relationship between
Norwegian and immigrant transition rates was about the same across counties within each cohort
as across cohorts. The attainment of Pakistani youth in particular were far more sensitive to
capacity constraints in upper secondary education than that of native Norwegians.
We find that the largest difference in attainment between immigrant and native youth can
be attributed to the transition between compulsory schooling and the first year of upper sec-
ondary education. For immigrant youth, and Pakistanis in particular, dropout was substantially
reduced by the reform, and this is the major reason for the improved educational attainments
of immigrants compared to natives during this short period.
Our main conclusion is that the Norwegian upper secondary school reform implemented in
1994 played an important role in reducing differences in educational attainment between native
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Norwegians and immigrants. The wider implication of this is that non-targeted reforms, with
an emphasis on securing access to secondary education for everyone, may give a sharp reduction
in the educational dropout rates among groups that are constrained in terms of limited access.
Ethnic minority youth and children from poor families are likely to be overrepresented in these
groups. The evidence from this study is thus in line with findings of recent studies of compulsory
schooling reforms, such as Aakvik et al (2003), Meghir and Palme (2005), and Oreopoulos (2006),
showing that extensions of years of compulsory schooling have the largest effect on the attainment
of pupils with a disadvantaged background and short expected education careers.
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Table 1: Highest completed education level 4 years after compulsory schooling, by group and
cohort
grade level coh. ’92 coh. ’93 coh. ’94 coh. ’95
Natives pop.size 48477 46167 46778 46458
9 0.036 0.032 0.024 0.026
10 0.105 0.094 0.069 0.071
11 0.182 0.184 0.205 0.231
12+ 0.677 0.689 0.702 0.672
Pakistanis pop.size 266 254 313 339
9 0.188 0.094 0.128 0.086
10 0.188 0.150 0.137 0.133
11 0.210 0.205 0.224 0.242
12+ 0.413 0.551 0.511 0.540
Vietnamese pop.size 139 132 159 209
9 0.050 0.045 0.025 0.043
10 0.158 0.121 0.101 0.077
11 0.295 0.197 0.258 0.301
12+ 0.496 0.636 0.616 0.579
Table 2: Covariates with mean and standard deviation, by group
Norwegians Pakistani Vietnamese
variable mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
gender 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.50
born in Norway n.a. n.a. 0.70 0.46 0.09 0.28
father missing 0.037 0.19 0.074 0.26 0.12 0.32
father’s income 25.7 12.6 11.7 11.4 11.0 10.0
father’s education 11.2 3.4 5.3 5.8 6.8 5.5
father’s education missing 0.005 0.07 0.44 0.50 0.15 0.35
father’s age 43.3 10.1 44.1 13.4 41.0 16.6
mother missing 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.25
mother’s income 13.8 8.7 3.2 5.4 8.0 8.4
mother’s education 10.9 2.6 3.3 4.9 6.0 5.0
mother’s education missing 0.006 0.08 0.59 0.49 0.16 0.36
mother’s age 41.8 6.6 41.7 8.7 39.9 12.9
age at immigration n.a. n.a. 1.76 3.37 5.6 3.9
Table 3: Transition rates to completed 10th grade first year after compulsory schooling, by group
and cohort. Population size in parentheses.
cohort ’92 cohort ’93 cohort ’94 cohort ’95
Natives 0.88 (48788) 0.88 (46572) 0.92 (47127) 0.92 (46785)
Pakistanis 0.56 (275) 0.75 (261) 0.76 (318) 0.83 (344)
Vietnamese 0.81 (141) 0.88 (134) 0.91 (211) 0.89 (211)
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Table 4: Mean of γc,r, by group and cohort
cohort ’92 cohort ’93 cohort ’94 cohort ’95
Natives -0.9648 -0.9662 -0.4942 -0.5731
Pakistanis -1.4487 -1.3468 -0.8345 -0.8431
Vietnamese -0.9888 -0.9858 -0.5323 -0.6169
Table 5: Parameter Estimates - Models of Pakistani pupils’ completion of 10th grade in the first
year after compulsory schooling, with standard errors in parentheses
Variable Natives Pak. M1 Pak. M2 Pak. M3 Pak. M4 Pak. M5 Pak M6
intercept n.a. 0.2560 -0.418 -0.1977 -0.299 -0.0993 -0.1160
(0.1216) (0.913) (0.9275) (0.897) (0.915) (0.912)
female 0.146 n.a. -0.0071 -0.0213 -0.0011 -0.0124 -0.0129
(0.0161) (0.1397) (0.1412) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139)
born in Norway n.a n.a 0.522 0.5730 0.531 0.593 0.594
(0.234) (0.231) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236)
father’s income 0.0206 n.a 0.0233 0.0266 0.0240 0.0274 0.0275
(0.0008) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070)
father’s education 0.0557 n.a. -0.0266 -0.0189 -0.0168 -0.0116 -0.0112
(0.0043) (0.0415) (0.0418) (0.0407) (0.0411) (0.0410)
father’s age 0.0011 n.a. -0.0035 -0.0055 -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0021) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0168) (0.0168)
mother’s income 0.0206 n.a. 0.012 0.0066 0.0116 0.0070 0.0066
(0.0010) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0142)
mother’s education 0.0577 n.a. 0.0605 0.0640 0.0611 0.0628 0.0630
(0.0049) (0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0314) (0.0320) (0.0320)
mother’s age 0.0215 n.a. 0.0085 0.0133 0.0070 0.0124 0.0127
(0.0022) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0176)
age at immigration n.a. n.a. -0.0315 -0.0187 -0.0317 -0.0185 -0.0178
(0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0308) (0.0314) (0.0313)
capacity constraints n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4402 n.a. 1.4364 1.500
(0.3130) (0.3130) (0.191)
cap. con. cross-coh. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5465
(0.2485)
cohort93 n.a. 0.8274 0.7719 0.6400 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.1873) (0.1942) (0.1991)
cohort94 n.a. 0.9022 0.9465 0.0569 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.1791) (0.1873) (0.2716)
cohort95 n.a. 1.3190 1.4192 0.5340 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.1877) (0.1956) (0.2771)
post-reform n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.83 -0.0914 n.a.
(0.139) (0.233)
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates - Models of Vietnamese pupils’ completion of 10th grade in the
first year after compulsory schooling, with standard errors in parentheses
Variable Natives Vie. M1 Vie. M2 Vie. M3 Vie. M4 Vie. M5 Vie M6
intercept n.a. 1.4404 -0.7871 -0.5900 -0.4591 -0.2704 -0.3306
(0.2140) (1.1508) (1.1602) (1.1309) (1.1402) (1.1231)
female 0.146 n.a. 0.0516 0.0666 0.0892 0.1036 0.1055
(0.0161) (0.2478) (0.2505) (0.2456) (0.2484) (0.2484)
born in Norway n.a n.a 0.6354 0.8322 0.5167 0.7381 0.7173
(0.6708) (0.6752) (0.6663) (0.6719) (0.6700)
father’s income 0.0206 n.a 0.0181 0.0213 0.0178 0.0209 0.0208
(0.0008) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
father’s education 0.0557 n.a. 0.0098 0.0037 0.0092 0.0023 0.0025
(0.0043) (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0418)
father’s age 0.0011 n.a. -0.0206 -0.0179 -0.0219 -0.0187 -0.0186
(0.0021) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256)
mother’s income 0.0206 n.a. 0.0112 0.0115 0.0104 0.0106 0.0109
(0.0010) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0194)
mother’s education 0.0577 n.a. -0.0116 -0.0139 -0.0113 -0.0129 -0.0129
(0.0049) (0.0399) (0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0401) (0.0402)
mother’s age 0.0215 n.a. 0.0774 0.0756 0.0769 0.0751 0.0751
(0.0022) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0306)
age at immigration n.a. n.a. -0.0576 -0.0438 -0.0628 -0.0495 -0.0496
(0.0387) (0.0397) (0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0391)
capacity constraints n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1981 n.a. 1.2251 1.1896
(0.4062) (0.4047) (0.4047)
cap. con. cross-coh. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0627
(0.6023)
cohort93 n.a. 0.5577 0.5242 0.5234 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.3417) (0.3515) (0.3559)
cohort94 n.a. 0.8351 0.8525 0.3086 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.3454) (0.3544) (0.4000)
cohort95 n.a. 0.6127 0.4786 0.0125 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.3047) (0.3219) (0.3624)
post-reform n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4169 -0.0998 n.a.
(0.2477) (0.3016)
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Table 7: Population size and transition rate to each grade level, by years since compulsory
schooling and cohort, the native control group
year level cohort ’92 cohort ’93 cohort ’94 cohort ’95
pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate
1 10 48788 0.88 46572 0.88 47127 0.92 46785 0.92
2 10 5781 0.56 5376 0.62 3569 0.56 3737 0.54
2 11 42993 0.78 41119 0.82 43519 0.86 42973 0.86
3 10 2547 0.22 2038 0.19 1548 0.20 1706 0.18
3 11 12475 0.53 10771 0.54 8116 0.56 8016 0.53
3 12 33554 0.78 33528 0.80 37262 0.72 36890 0.67
4 10 1982 0.12 1642 0.10 1232 0.09 1385 0.11
4 11 6445 0.25 5341 0.21 3864 0.19 4025 0.21
4 12 13548 0.46 11940 0.38 14864 0.40 16545 0.40
Table 8: Population size and transition rate to each grade level, by years since compulsory
schooling and cohort, the Pakistani group
year level cohort ’92 cohort ’93 cohort ’94 cohort ’95
pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate
1 10 275 0.56 261 0.75 318 0.76 344 0.83
2 10 120 0.37 66 0.50 76 0.38 59 0.42
2 11 154 0.74 194 0.73 241 0.81 284 0.78
3 10 76 0.17 32 0.09 46 0.09 32 0.00
3 11 83 0.48 81 0.44 73 0.44 87 0.47
3 12 113 0.73 143 0.78 195 0.73 221 0.65
4 10 58 0.14 29 0.17 42 0.05 32 0.09
4 11 53 0.19 46 0.28 45 0.09 46 0.09
4 12 70 0.34 64 0.34 82 0.20 117 0.33
Table 9: Population size and transition rate to each grade level, by years since compulsory
schooling and cohort, the Vietnamese group
year level cohort ’92 cohort ’93 cohort ’94 cohort ’95
pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate pop. size rate
1 10 141 0.81 134 0.88 161 0.91 211 0.89
2 10 27 0.59 16 0.50 15 0.53 24 0.54
2 11 110 0.75 117 0.83 146 0.84 185 0.90
3 10 11 0.36 8 0.25 7 0.43 11 0.18
3 11 42 0.57 27 0.44 32 0.60 32 0.56
3 12 81 0.75 95 0.86 118 0.81 166 0.73
4 10 7 0.29 6 0.00 4 0.00 9 0.00
4 11 22 0.14 16 0.00 16 0.19 16 0.00
4 12 41 0.49 26 0.44 41 0.46 63 0.38
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Table 10: Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses, parameters associated with
selection effects
parameter natives Pakistanis Vietnamese
α10,1 0.0260 0.6641 1.4801
(0.0508) (0.3103) (0.7300)
α10,2 -2.2234 -2.0586 1.9145
(0.3071) (1.1523) (1.4557)
α10,3 -0.2041 1.9714 -1.9089
(0.3907) (1.1002) (1.3460)
α10,4 -0.8647 0.9507 0.1354
(0.9475) (1.7125) (1.8451)
α11,2 1.1981 1.5138 -0.2411
(0.0478) (0.6557) (0.6400)
α11,3 1.1971 -1.9408 -2.9859
(0.1149) (1.0194) (1.2426)
α11,4 0.5543 1.9453 -0.3364
(0.0662) (1.0519) (0.4035)
α12,3 4.7199 -0.2836 -0.7262
(0.5223) (0.6606) (1.1024)
α12,4 1.6996 -1.2905 -1.3439
(0.1387) (0.3913) (0.8884)
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Table 11: Parameter Estimates - Models of Pakistani pupils’ completion of second year of upper
secondary in the second year after compulsory schooling, with standard errors in parentheses
Variable Natives Pak. M1 Pak. M2 Pak. M3 Pak. M4
intercept n.a. 1.0473 0.4843 0.7135 1.2133
(0.1838) (1.1032) (1.1333) (1.3602)
female 0.0141 n.a. 0.1566 0.1599 0.1562
(0.0132) (0.1703) (0.1704) (0.1888)
born in Norway n.a n.a 0.2338 0.2444 0.3267
(0.3034) (0.3042) (0.3384)
father’s income 0.0172 n.a 0.0103 0.0107 0.0136
(0.0007) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0083)
father’s education 0.0666 n.a. 0.0994 0.0985 0.1065
(0.0035) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0495)
father’s age 0.0013 n.a. -0.0124 -0.0128 -0.0138
(0.0018) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0172)
mother’s income 0.0129 n.a. 0.0065 0.0062 0.0088
(0.0008) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0140)
mother’s education 0.0645 n.a. 0.0437 0.0419 0.0456
(0.0041) (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0390)
mother’s age 0.0157 n.a. -0.0070 -0.0062 -0.0028
(0.0020) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0166)
age at immigration n.a. n.a. -0.0692 -0.0665 -0.0694
(0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0451)
capacity constraints n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.7002 0.8819
(0.7887) (0.7070)
cohort93 n.a. -0.0427 -0.0655 -0.2692 -0.2238
(0.2450) (0.2530) (0.3417) (0.3133)
cohort94 n.a. 0.4241 0.5070 0.1835 0.2773
(0.2472) (0.2571) (0.4440) (0.3975)
cohort95 n.a. 0.2283 0.3263 -0.0219 0.1114
(0.2332) (0.2424) (0.4592) (0.4006)
30
Table 12: Parameter Estimates - Models of Vietnamese pupils’ completion of second year of
upper secondary in the second year after compulsory schooling, with standard errors in paren-
theses
Variable Natives Vie. M1 Vie. M2 Vie. M3 Vie. M4
intercept n.a. 1.1231 0.4253 0.6229 0.6269
(0.2216) (1.1365) (1.1862) (1.0293)
female 0.0141 n.a. -0.0464 -0.0334 -0.0464
(0.0132) (0.2483) (0.2994) (0.2598)
born in Norway n.a n.a -0.3873 -0.3844 -0.3832
(0.6265) (0.6272) (0.6251)
father’s income 0.0172 n.a 0.0157 0.0159 0.0147
(0.0007) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170)
father’s education 0.0666 n.a. 0.0427 0.0422 0.0441
(0.0035) (0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0414)
father’s age 0.0013 n.a. -0.0296 -0.0297 -0.0287
(0.0018) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0206)
mother’s income 0.0129 n.a. 0.0293 0.0301 0.0302
(0.0008) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0210)
mother’s education 0.0645 n.a. -0.0175 -0.0190 -0.0179
(0.0041) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0406)
mother’s age 0.0157 n.a. 0.0574 0.0567 0.0552
(0.0020) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0337)
age at immigration n.a. n.a. -0.1527 -0.1529 -0.1493
(0.0403) (0.0404) (0.0401)
capacity constraints n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4268 0.0924
(0.7306) (0.6990)
cohort93 n.a. 0.4559 0.3193 0.2164 0.2783
(0.3308) (0.3475) (0.3897) (0.3833)
cohort94 n.a. 0.5029 0.5164 0.2673 0.4288
(0.2472) (0.3335) (0.5398) (0.4909)
cohort95 n.a. 1.0444 0.9944 0.7495 0.9181
(0.3282) (0.3537) (0.5464) (0.5107)
Table 13: Conditional and unconditional transition rates to 11th grade, before and after reform
group pre-reform post-reform
cond. uncond. diff. cond. uncond. diff. diff. in diff.
Natives 0.8017 0.7976 0.0041 0.8570 0.8546 0.0024 0.0017
Pakistani 0.7274 0.6765 0.0509 0.7899 0.7623 0.0276 0.0233 (-0.0005,0.0720)
Vietnamese 0.7859 0.7927 -0.0068 0.8664 0.8698 -0.0034 -0.0034 (-0.0270,0.0064)
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